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March 25, 2004 
 
Thank you for the opportunity to provide a statement on proposed House Resolution 568. 
I want to make three points. First, the"law of nations" and the practices of other 
constitutional systems have been used since the Founding period to assist the Court in 
reaching appropriate interpretations of American law. Second, the Court's use of foreign 
law in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003), was not to bind or control its 
judgments of constitutional questions under U.S. law but to assist the Court in making the 
best interpretations of our own law. Third, legislative directions to the courts on how to 
interpret the Constitution raise serious separation of powers questions and might be 
perceived to threaten judicial independence in ways inconsistent with important traditions 
of American constitutionalism. For these reasons I would urge the House not to adopt the 
proposed resolution.  
 
Far from being hostile to considering foreign countries' views or laws, the Founding 
generation of our Nation had what the signers of the Declaration of Independence 
described as a"decent Respect.2 to the Opinions of Mankind." Congress was empowered 
in our Constitution to regulate foreign commerce and to prescribe"Offenses against the 
Law of Nations," the President authorized to receive ambassadors, and the federal courts 
given jurisdiction over cases arising under treaties as well as under the Constitution and 
laws of the United States, and over suits affecting ambassadors, or involving aliens or 
foreign countries as parties in some cases. The Federalist Papers explained that 
 
An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government for two 
reasons: the one is, that, independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it 
is desirable ... that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and 
honorable policy; the second is, that in doubtful cases, particularly where the national 
councils may be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest, the presumed or 
known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed. 
 
The Federalist No. 63 (Hamilton or Madison). Although Federalist No. 63 was not 
directed to the courts, Federalist No. 80 (Hamilton) explained the need for a judicial 
power broad enough to resolve disputes in which foreign nations had an interest in order 
to avoid causes for war. U.S. Supreme Court Justices from the founding period 
recognized the relevance of the"law of nations" in interpreting U.S. law and resolving 
disputes before the federal courts. As Justice Story said, in writing the foundational 
Supreme Court decision in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, the judicial power of the United 
States included categories of jurisdiction, such as admiralty,"in the correct adjudication of 
which foreign nations are deeply interested ....[and in] which the principles of the law and 
comity of nations often form an essential inquiry." Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 
Wheat) 304, 335 (1816). 
 
The Justices have used understandings of the law and practice of other nations on a.2 
Although there was no opinion of the divided Court and the writ of error was dismissed 
for want of jurisdiction, Justices Story, McLean and Wayne concurred" entirely" with the 
Chief Justice's opinion. 39 U.S. at 561. The Reporter's Note at the end of the case 
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indicates that after the case was disposed of in the Supreme Court, the Vermont state 
court concluded that," by a majority of the Court it was held that the power claimed to 
deliver up George Holmes did not exist" and discharged him. 39 U.S. at 598. number of 
occasions to assist in reaching correct interpretations of the U.S. Constitution. 
 
Thus, for example, in Worcestor v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 560-61 (1832), the Court, in an 
opinion by Chief Justice John Marshall, considered the law of nations as helpful in 
defining the status of Indian tribes under the U.S. Constitution, concluding that they 
retained rights of self-government with which the states could not interfere. In Holmes v. 
Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 569-73 (1840), Chief Justice Taney's opinion relied on the 
practices of other nations to help interpret the Constitution as precluding a state governor 
from extraditing a fugitive to Canada. 
 
In other cases, as well, the early Court took cognizance of the" law of nations" or other 
countries' practices in resolving particular controversies: In The Schooner Exchange v. 
McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 137-46 (1812), the Court relied on" the usages and received 
obligations of the civilized world" to hold a foreign sovereign's vessel in a U.S. port to be 
immune from judicial jurisdiction. In Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 
118 (1804), Chief Justice Marshall wrote that" an act of Congress ought never to be 
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction" exists. And in 
determining what the law of nations was, in 1815 the Court commented that"[t]he 
decisions of the Courts of every country, so far as they are founded upon a law common 
to every country, will be received, not as authority, but with respect." Thirty Hogsheads 
of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. 191, 198 (1815).. 
 
This brings me to my second point. The Court's recent references to foreign law and legal 
practice seems to me entirely consistent with the founding generation's respectful interest 
in other countries' opinions and legal rules. Lawrence did not treat foreign court decisions 
as binding authority, which is an important distinction. Rather, the foreign decisions were 
cited in Lawrence for two purposes: The first was to correct or clarify the historical 
record referred to in Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986), a decision reversed by Lawrence. 
 
As the Lawrence Court wrote,"The sweeping references by Chief Justice Burger to the 
history of Western civilization and to Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards did not 
take account of other authorities pointing in an opposite direction," including the 
Dudgeon case decided by the European Court of Human Rights in 1981. Second, the 
Lawrence opinion suggested, the European decisions invalidating laws prohibiting adult, 
consensual homosexual conduct raised the question whether there were different 
governmental interests in the United States that would support such a prohibition on 
human freedom, and concluded there were not. See 123 S. Ct. at 2483. This use of 
foreign law to interrogate and question our own understandings is something that will 
help improve the process of judicial reasoning, but certainly does not necessarily lead to 
the conclusion that our law should follow that foreign law. 
 
Indeed, on a number of occasions our Court has referred to foreign practice to distinguish 
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our own Constitution from that of other nations. In the great Youngstown Steel Case, the 
Court held that President Truman lacked constitutional power to order seizure of the steel 
companies. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson alluded to the dangers of dictatorship that 
other countries had recently experienced, Justice Jackson explaining in some detail 
features of the Weimar Constitution in Germany.3 After describing the protections of, 
inter alia, England, Scotland and India, against improper custodial confessions, 384 U.S. 
at 486-89, the Court indicated that our own situation was similar enough that their 
positive experience gave" assurance that lawlessness will not result from warning an 
individual of his rights or allowing him to exercise them." Id. at 489. It went on to say:" 
 
It is consistent with our legal system that we give at least as much protection to these 
rights as is given in the jurisdictions described. We deal in our country with rights 
grounded in a specific requirement of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, whereas 
other jurisdictions arrived at their conclusions on the basis of principles of justice not so 
specifically defined." Id. at 489-90. that allowed Hitler to assume dictatorial powers. See 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.) 
("absurd to see a dictator" in President Truman but"accretion of dangerous power does 
not come in a day"); id. at 651-52 (Jackson, J.) (discussing German, French and British 
approaches to emergency powers). And in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 489-90 
(1966) the Court suggested that our Fifth Amendment should be interpreted to provide at 
least as much protection to rights against improper custodial interrogations as did certain 
other countries.3 
 
Considering other courts' decisions on shared concepts - of liberty, equality, freedom of 
expression, cruel and unusual punishment - can help clarify what the U.S. Constitution 
stands for - to what extent its precepts are shared, and to what extent they are distinctive. 
The U.S. constitution has, directly or indirectly, inspired many other nations to include 
commitments to liberty, freedom and equality in their own constitutions. It is thus 
understandable that such nations may look to our courts' decisions and over time expect 
our courts to be aware of their courts' interpretations of legal concepts having a common 
source of inspiration. For the many nations around the world whose own constitutions 
have been inspired in part by that of the United States, and whose judges believe that we 
share commitments to ideas of liberty, freedom and equality, the U.S. Court's occasional 
consideration of foreign court decisions is, in a sense, a recognition of common judicial 
commitments -often inspired by the example of the United States - to the protection of 
individual rights. And on the current Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist,4 as well as Justices 
Breyer,5 Ginsburg,6 Kennedy,7 Scalia 8 and Stevens,9 have referred to or noted foreign 
or international legal sources in their opinions in U.S. constitutional cases. 
 
It is thus not only a traditional legal practice but one that has been used by justices who 
otherwise have very different views. Finally, the questions of what sources are to be 
considered in giving meaning to the Constitution in adjudication is one that is, in my 
view, committed by the Constitution to the judicial department. Marbury v. Madison 
famously explained:" It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department 
to say what the law is." 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). A core aspect of determining what the 
law of the Constitution is requires consultation of relevant and illuminating materials - 
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from the.7 enactment and ratification history, from interpretations by state and federal 
courts of the provision or of analogous state constitutional provisions, from the course of 
decisions by legislatures and executive officials about what action is required or 
permitted, and from the considered judgments of other courts and commentators on the 
same or analogous questions. All of these kinds of sources have been and may be 
considered when the justices conclude that they shed legal light on the problem before 
them. Efforts by the political branches to prescribe what precedents and authorities can 
and cannot be considered by the Court in interpreting the Constitution in cases properly 
before it would be inconsistent with our separation of powers system. It could be seen 
both here and elsewhere as an attack on the independence of the courts in performing 
their core adjudicatory activities. 
 
Around the world, the most widely emulated institution established by the U.S. 
Constitution has been the provision for independent courts to engage in judicial review of 
the constitutionality of the acts of other branches and levels of government. Congress 
should be loath even to attempt to intrude on this judicial function, with respect to a 
practice that dates back to the founding, and at a time when the United States is deeply 
engaged in promoting democratic constitutionalism in countries around the world, 
including provision for independent courts to provide enforcement of constitutional 
guarantees. 
